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For more than 60 years, development organizations have poured billions of dollars of aid money
into developing countries with the hopes that their projects will increase economic growth, reduce poverty,
and improve the health status of people in developing countries. Yet, the result has been one of general
failure; despite 2 trillion dollars worth of aid money delivered by organizations, there is little progress to
show for it. In some cases, development projects have even caused more harm to a developing country
than good. The ineffective,” top down” approach of the last 60 years must be ceased and a new way of
development planning must be found. One possible way to make development more effective is through
scaling up: i.e. the execution of smaller, community-level pilot projects that, if successful can then be
scaled up on a national level, replicated in other communities, and/or replicated in other countries. This
paper looks at the potential of using scaling up models to make development projects more effective by
examining the development failures of the past, scaling up practices of various development
organizations, and case studies highlighting the benefits of scaling up.
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Introduction
60 years of failure
The past 60 years of international development history have yielded very little
progress when it comes to sustained economic growth, poverty alleviation, improvement
of health status etc. A change in development thinking is therefore necessary. However,
in order to create, or even begin to think about an alternative method to development,
one has to address the mistakes that have been made in the past. A discussion on the
history of aid and development serves to illustrate where development organizations
and institutions have gone wrong, and the lessons that can be learned from their
failures.
The history of aid and development work, for all intensive purposes, began at a
conference in Bretton Woods, U.S.A in 1944 to address the problem of the
reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Out of this conference were born two of the
primary development institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, now the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, or IMF. The
chief purpose of the World Bank was to provide funds for the reconstruction of Europe,
while the IMF’s was to stabilize the global financial system (Harold 2003), and they set
out about this task immediately.
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One of the first and greatest development projects that came about after the
Bretton Woods Conference is known as the Marshall Plan. This plan, championed by
then-U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, delivered over $13 billion of aid to
Europe for the purpose of reconstruction (Milward 1984). The results were very positive,
and there was a general increase in output of European economies of over 35% from
pre-World War II rates by the mid-1950’s (Eichengreen 2008).
The success of the Marshall Plan led to a belief in development theory that the
same successes could be repeated in the developing economies of poor countries. This
was the first and most important fallacy that was introduced into the development world,
the belief that a direct cash injection by these institutions would be all that would be
needed to get a developing country’s economy off and running. Bolstered by the
success of the Marshall Plan, development organizations, led by the World Bank and
the IMF, began to dump huge sums of money into developing countries in the form of
large development projects and poverty reduction strategies.
These, Marshall Plan-like projects were usually formed through negotiations
between the organizations and the national governments of the prospective lender
countries. Impact evaluations for these projects was often short sighted or simply not
done. The disbursement of aid without the necessary institutions to do so, i.e.
monitoring organizations, adequate judicial systems, functional health and delivery
systems, infrastructure, administration, accountancy, etc. led to mass inefficiencies and
waste, mostly due to corruption and mismanagement of aid.
It was no secret that these projects were not helping to improve poverty and
inequality in any significant way, and yet development organizations continued their
ineffective aid donations unabated. Many reasons have been given for this
unwillingness to change. Easterly (2007a) argues that it is due to the feeling that the
Western countries have a duty to “develop” countries in poverty through the use of
grandiose plans. Cochrane (2009) attributes it to development organizations believing
that poverty is the same throughout the world, and so one large, “one size fits all” plan
should be able to alleviate poverty equally. Others, such as Williams (2001) and Nielson
(1997) see aid not as a tool for development, but rather as a foreign policy tool that
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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Western powers use to influence policies and political developments in developing
countries. Kessler and Van Dorp (1997) concur with this theory, adding that aid is used
to liberalize markets for the sake of resource extraction by Western multi-national
corporations.
Whatever the

Table 1: Ten Worst Per Capita
Growth Rates 1980-2002 and
Their Dependence on Aid

reason, development
organizations have
stuck to the “top-down”
strategy of
development planning
that they have created,
investing more than $2
trillion of aid money in
this way over the last

Nigeria
Niger
Togo
Zambia
Madagascar
Cote d'Ivoire
Haiti
Liberia
Congo
Sierra Leone
Median
Average

Per Capita Growth Aid GDP %
1980-2002
1980-2002
-1.6%
0.59%
-1.7%
13.15%
-1.8%
11.18%
-1.8%
19.98%
-1.9%
10.78%
-1.9%
5.60%
-2.6%
9.41%
-3.9%
11.94%
-5.0%
4.69%
-5.8%
5.80%
-1.9%
-2.8%

Percentage of time
under IMF programs
1980-2002
20%
63%
72%
53%
71%
74%
55%
22%
39%
50%

10.98%
9.31%

54%
52%

Source: Easterly (2007)

sixty years (Dichter
2005). The results
have been less than
positive. Africa, for
example, has seen its
poverty rates go up
from 11 percent to 66
percent between the
years of 1970 and
1998, when aid flows in
the continent were at
their height (Moyo
2009). Almost 13% of children under five years of age still die in Africa (World Bank
2009), mostly through completely preventable diseases. Easterly (2007b) shows that
the ten worst performers in terms of income per capita for the period from 1980-2002
were heavily dependent on aid and IMF programs and yet the result has been one of
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persistent negative growth (Table 1). A look at the Human Development Indicators for
the same countries (Table 2, see Human Development Report 2010) does not suggest
much improvement in any indicator of standard of living despite a heavy and long term
dependence on aid.
Given all of these factors, there can be no other conclusion other than the fact
that the last 60 years of development history have produced very little positive results.
The “top-down” approach of development organizations has yielded very little success
considering the enormous costs of development projects. In some instances, as in the
subsequent case study, development projects have even caused further
underdevelopment.
Case Study: Brazil’s Polonoroeste Project
The Polonoroeste Project, started in the early 1980’s, is a clear example of how
the mismanagement of a “top-down” project can not only hinder a developing country’s
efforts at development but can actually cause serious long-term damages. In 1981, The
World Bank gave $443.4 million dollars for the construction of an enormous 1,500
kilometer road connecting Brazil’s populous southern region to the sparsely populated,
Amazon region of the northwest province of Rondonia (Rich 1994). The Bank and the
Brazilian government wanted people to move out of the more populous south to new
plots of land where they could farm cash crops such as cocoa and coffee.
From the outset the project lacked any type of preliminary planning or evaluation.
The fact that this road would pass through a mass of uninhabited rainforest was not
taken into account neither by the Brazilian government nor by the World Bank project
managers. Also ignored was the fact that some 10,000 Amerindians lived in the region
where the road was to be built. These people, constituting various tribes, had lived in
the rainforest for centuries (Cultural Survival Inc. 2010). Some of the tribes lived so
deep into the-at the time-pristine jungle that they had not had hardly any contact with
the modern world. Despite these concerns, the Bank called praised the project, calling it
a “model of ecological and social planning” (Caufield 1996).
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David Price, an anthropologist who had experience with the communities in the
affected area, had doubts about the project from the beginning. He was assured by
World Bank officials, however, that the Bank was concerned about the well-being of the
tribes and would not begin the projection without an evaluation, which they let him
undertake (Caulfield 1996). Price’s findings proved to be controversial; he chronicled his
discovery in a 50 page report and recommended that the project not begin because it
could potentially destroy the lives of the Amerindian communities. He added that
rampant corruption by members of the government would undermine the project entirely
(Rich 1994). His report was downplayed by the World Bank, who even invited Price to
Washington and tried to force him to sign a statement that stated that he understood the
Bank was sincere about doing enough to protect the Indians, so that Price would not
bring more pressure upon them (Payer 1982).
The government and World Bank decided to kick off the program despite Price’s
recommendations. Within a very short amount of time, thanks to a government ad
campaign, an enormous wave of settlers flooded north into Rondônia (Rich 1994).
Within a span of five years, nearly half a million settlers had moved to Rondônia, more
than the Brazilian land agency had land titles for. In order to survive, the settlers began
cutting down the forest and moving into the lands of the indigenous tribes.
The newly cleared ground did not prove fertile, so the settlers cleared more and
more land. In just a few years, an area about the size of the American state of
Wisconsin had been decimated. NASA, which was able to see the cleared area from
space, called the deforestation “the largest man-made change to the Earth’s surface”
(Caufield 1996). The Polonoroeste Project transformed the province of Rondônia from
one of the least deforested areas of the Amazon rainforest to one of the most
deforested by the end of the 1980’s.
The indigenous peoples of Rondônia had their homes and way of life completely
destroyed in just under a decade. What made the situation even worse was that the
settlers and deforestation brought about an incredible amount of disease. Malaria
infected some 250,000 people, settler and indigenous alike. The incidence of the
disease reached 100 percent in some areas. Some tribes faced extinction from other
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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diseases such as measles, tuberculosis and widespread influenza epidemics. Tribes
with infant mortality rates ranging from 25 to even 50 percent were even reported during
this time (Greenbaum 1984). Settlers who were not able to remain in Rondônia
eventually went back to the overpopulated Southern cities, bringing these diseases with
them.
Not only was Brazil saddled with the debt from the failed project, not to mention
widespread deforestation, an almost country-wide outbreak of diseases, and misplaced
populations; they eventually had to borrow even more money from the World Bank to
deal with these issues. The situation got so dire that in 1989, the World Bank gave
Brazil another loan for $99 million (Rich 1994) to combat the malaria epidemic, which by
that time was estimated to have cost over $200 million. Part of the loan financed the
spraying of 3,000 tons of DDT, a chemical known to have negative effects on humans,
wildlife, and nature, to combat the proliferation of mosquitoes carrying malaria.
Upon hearing of the tragedy in Rondônia, the United States House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research, and the
Environment held a special hearing on the Polonoroeste project (Caulfield 1996). One
of the witnesses that testified was Jose Lutzenberger, a Brazilian agronomist, who
specifically blamed the World Bank for the mismanagement of the project (Lutzeberger
1985). David Price also testified before the subcommittee, recounting all of the
pressures he had faced by Bank (Rich 1994). He added that there was never any
information provided to attest to the feasibility or benefit of the Polonoroeste project.
The World Bank, on its part, staunchly defended the project, saying it was “an
opportunity to develop sustainable agriculture” (Caufield 1996). However, memos from
World Bank staff show that Bank officials were well aware of the results of the project;
including the extent of the environmental damage it caused (Caufield 1996). While the
congressional subcommittee was taken aback at the testimonies, it did not implicate the
World Bank of any wrongdoing. The World Bank has since approved more loan money
be disbursed for further projects in the Rondônia region.
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Making sure Polonoroeste does not happen again: the potential of pilot projects
and scaling up.
The potential damage from the Polonoroeste project cannot even begin to be
calculated. What was at first a mismanaged project turned into a humanitarian, public
health and environmental disaster by the 1990’s, one which the region is still recovering
from, and one which has caused Brazil more than $1 billion dollars in aid money alone.
The most troubling aspect of it all is that projects like Polonoroeste have been and
continue to be approved and executed all over the world.
The task, therefore, must be to end the “top-down” development projects and find
an alternative that is sustainable and produces real results. The purpose of this
undertaking is not only to enact better development policy; it is a moral imperative to
make sure projects like Polonoroeste are never executed again. The key to undertaking
such a task comes from learning from the mistakes of the past 60 years of development
history, as they have heretofore been discussed.
Development organizations’ 60 year quest for a second Marshall Plan has
produced many clues about what a solution to “top-down” development planning should
avoid. From the previous discussion and case study, we can see that “top-down”
planning lacks four things which have caused the general ineffectiveness and failure of
development projects: a lack of in depth impact evaluation in any stage of the
development process, a lack of monitoring the project and seeing if it is truly reaching
people in poverty, and a lack of partnership with communities and organizations on the
local level to make projects more effective, and a general lack of sustainability. Any
successful development alternative, therefore, must address these four factors and
effectively flip the development paradigm to a “bottom up approach.”
An approach that has great potential and should be examined more closely is
that of the execution of pilot projects, or small targeted projects in one specific region,
and then scaling up successful ones to other regions and countries. This method
bypasses the “top-down” approach and evaluates projects solely on their effectiveness
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at the local level. The rest of the paper will be devoted to the study of scaling up, how
different organizations employ it, and its potential in the world of development.

Methodology
While my interest in alternative development models has existed since I began
studying international development, I have fairly recently began to look at scaling up in
and of itself as a possible solution to development ineffectiveness. I had heard and read
about many organizations talking about scaling up to varying degrees and in different
contexts, but never as a definitive approach to project planning. It was not until a
briefing at the Swiss Organization for Cooperation and Development (SDC), where a
representative from the organization talked about the need to increase the comparative
advantage of development projects through scaling up existing projects that I really
began to think about this approach.
In an effort to describe scaling up and its potential for more effective
development planning, informational interviews and follow-ups with organizations were
at first attempted, namely with the World Health Organization, SDC, GAIN, and Green
Cross International. This, however, did not yield sufficient data due to non-response or
because these organizations did not employ scaling up as a process of development
planning. GAIN, for example, stated that they employed scaling up of their fortification
programs by increasing their partnerships with businesses willing to participate in
fortification programs; while Green Cross International had no specific model for scaling
up and are currently in the planning stages of extending one of their school latrine
programs in another region of Ghana, and so could not provide any data.
My focus, therefore, shifted to researching how scaling up is defined, viewed,
and implemented among different organizations. I also looked at how scaling up and
pilot projects have been successfully used in development projects. A plethora of
programs and cases where scaling up was used were examined; however there was
almost no information on specific guidelines that development organizations used to
scale up projects. The only such information came from ExpandNet, a network of
research institutions, NGO’s, and development professionals that works to promote
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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scaling up. They provide a good amount of literature on scaling up, as well as specific
guidelines and organizations they have partnered with.
My study, therefore, will be based off of the ExpandNet model. It will begin with a
definition of scaling up, as used by ExpandNet. Then an analysis will be given of the
scaling up practices of three development organizations: the WHO, the United Nations
Development Programme, and the World Bank. Three case studies will then be
presented to fully show the benefits of scaling up. A discussion will follow that will
highlight how scaling up programs of the various organizations can provide better
results than the “top-down” approach, as well as limitations to scaling up and
recommendations.

Results
Defining Scaling Up and ExpandNet’s approach
Scaling up has been discussed as a need for development project planning in
recent years, especially after the realization that the efforts towards accomplishment of
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) need to be increased in order for the goals
to be met. However, it has never been quite clear what is meant by the term “scaling
up”. Sometimes, the term is used in much the same way that informational technology
specialists use it, that is that one talks about scaling up in terms of building a network to
support an increase or growth in a project (Bondi 2000). At other times, it is employed in
the context of a need for greater partnerships with other organizations to achieve such a
growth, as the example of GAIN discussed in the methodology. Still other times, and
particularly in development rhetoric, it is used to describe a need for greater funding or
support.
There is merit to all of these definitions, as they address different aspects of
development ineffectiveness. In order to address the limitations of the “top down”
approach, there is certainly a need for the creation of networks and partnerships, and
the need for funding never goes away. However, in the context of creating a
development project through the execution of pilot projects, a narrower definition of
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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scaling up is needed. Such a definition is provided by ExpandNet. They define scaling
up as "deliberate efforts to increase the impact of health innovations tested in pilot or
experimental projects so as to benefit more people and to foster policy and program
development on a lasting basis" (ExpandNet, 2004). This definition best serves the
purpose of this study, as it highlights the need to “increase impact on a lasting basis”,
which is the main purpose of reversing the traditional “top down” approach to
development.
ExpandNet, indeed, is one of the only organizations that treat scaling up as a
science of development and project management, and the only one that was found that
had guidelines and databases on scaling up. The organization outlines clear principles
to effective scaling up that should be addressed. First, it bases it bases an effective
scaling up program strictly on expansion of pilot projects. They do this for several
reasons:
•

Pilot projects provide an environment where a project or, as ExpandNet
terms it, an “innovation” can be successfully tested and evaluated.

•

Negative consequences or outcomes related to any part of the project can
be more easily identified and evaluated because the project is
implemented on a small scale.

•

Pilot projects provide an “insurance policy”. If a project fails, then the cost,
both monetary and societal, of the failure is not very high and the project
can be easily abandoned (ExpandNet & WHO 2009).

ExpandNet also provides very specific descriptions on the factors and players
involved in scaling up, which is valuable to describe briefly, as they will be discussed
further on. First, the pilot project, or innovation, must be specifically defined for the
context that it is being implemented in; that is, that it must be tailored to the specific
cultural characteristics of the community and it also must not encroach upon the human
rights of the local population. This is a very valuable way of looking at a development
project, as it focuses on the rights and culture of the people involved, unlike “top down”
projects who generally do not account for this. Second, ExpandNet recognizes the need
to assess and work within the country, region, and community (defined as the
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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“environment” by ExpandNet (2009)) where the project is to be implemented. A
successful project must evaluate whether and how the environment is able to
accommodate it. This include an evaluation of the political system, bureaucracy, health
sector (if applicable) socioeconomic and cultural contexts, and, especially crucial in
development project planning, people’s needs and rights. In order to accomplish this
successfully, ExpandNet calls for a “resource team” to be created for the evaluation and
implementation of the project. This resource team would be the one examining the
environment, including all of the environmental factors just listed, to determine if the
project is viable, and if there are any limitations that would hinder success. For this
purpose, people within the resource team must have credibility within the region that the
project is implemented. They also must include people from within the region, or who at
least know the workings of the region well, so as to ensure that the project will be ably
implemented and it effectiveness evaluated. This is also a contrast to “top down”
planning, which generally does not employ such measures.
If a pilot project proves successful, ExpandNet then recommends two different
types of scaling up: vertical and horizontal. Vertical scaling up involves enacting policies
within government to adopt a project on a national, sub national, or local level.
Horizontal scaling up, on the other hand, involves replicating the project in another
region or community, or expanding it to a larger population. However, it should be noted
that replication of a project is not a “mechanical duplication…in the matter of a franchise
operation. Rather, it requires adapting the innovation to the different environmental
contexts throughout a country or sub region” (ExpandNet & WHO 2009). Horizontal and
vertical scaling can also be simultaneous and even complimentary. As Gonzalves et al.
(2000) explains, scaling up vertically from one level to another (from community to
district, district to regional etc.) can provide opportunities for horizontal scaling up on the
higher level. Therefore, once scaling up begins, it has the potential to take off quite
rapidly, and hopefully have positive impact on people’s lives in a short period of time.
This horizontal-vertical mechanism is, in particular, in contrast with “top down” planning,
which creates projects that are generally nationwide and policy driven, without having
been previously tested.
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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ExpandNet and WHO: The Nine-step Model
The World Health Organization partnered with ExpandNet in 2010 to publish a
guideline for developing a scaling up strategy called Nine Steps to Developing a
Scaling-Up Strategy (ExpandNet & WHO 2010). This is one of the only works on scaling
up published by a large development organization. It very clearly explains the
ExpandNet approach in a step by step manner, with advice given to organizations and
development planners on how to scale up successfully.
Overview of the Model
A brief examination of the nine-step model shows its many merits as a project
planning tool, especially compared with the “top down” approach. In the first step of the
ExpandNet/WHO model, a successfully tested pilot project, or a “health innovation” for
the purposes of the WHO, is prepared to be scaled up. This entails examining the
project and determining feasibility, assessing cost-effectiveness of scaling up, as well as
a clear expression of what needs are to be addressed.
In the second step, the model calls for increasing the capacity of a community,
defined as “user organization” in the context of health innovation scaling up (ExpandNet
& WHO 2010), to adopt the scaled up project. One important aspect of this step to note
is that it calls for discussions with people within the community of whether or not they
have a perceived need for the project, and also whether individuals within the
community would be willing to advocate it. This is particularly invaluable to the success
of the project because it makes the project about the needs of the people within the
community as they see them, and not as they are seen by an outside organization. In
this way, ownership of the project can be established.
The third step is an assessment of the environment in the same way as has been
previously discussed (evaluation of political system, cultural factors etc). The fourth step
bares closer attention, however, as it gives further details about the creation of the
resource team. Here the model requires for at least some members of the resource
team to be the same members who created and tested the project in its pilot stages. It
also stipulates that there should be members of the resource team who are locals in the
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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community, so they may use their knowledge of the culture and important factors within
the community to better implement the scaled up project. ExpandNet and the WHO also
include a list of skills needed within the resource team to best implement scaling up,
including the capacity to train other members of the community, advocacy, and strategic
management, among others.
The fifth and sixth steps deal with the decisions of whether to scale up vertically
or horizontally. It may be presumed that vertical scaling up was given consideration
before horizontal scaling up so as to give a project some authority at in the policy and
administrative realm before scaling up to other communities and regions. In discussing,
vertical scaling up, the model provides ambitious guidance, including linking the project
to a country’s Strategic Poverty Reduction Strategies (SPRS) and the MDGs. The
model also addresses the need to analyze policy, legal, financial, logistical, and many
other factors needed to scale up vertically. It is clear from the emphasis placed on this
step that the WHO prefers vertical scaling up of projects to the highest (national and sub
national) levels of government. The sixth step is more limited in the scope of advice
given, reiterating ExpandNet’s mandate of adaptation of projects to better suit new
communities or regions.
Steps seven and eight address different types of scaling up that were not as
prominently addressed in the literature of ExpandNet’s policies. The seventh step
addresses the possibility of functional scaling up, or adding a new innovation to the
existing one that is being scaled up; for example, adding a program on child health to a
scaled up program on women’s health. This entails that the new innovation pass
through the previous six steps and that the resource team and environment be
reevaluated accordingly. This seems to be a particular goal of the WHO in scaling up,
as it is not a focus of ExpandNet’s.
In the eighth step, another type of scaling up, spontaneous scaling up, is
addressed. This refers to another community adopting the project without the help of the
resource team. While this may be beneficial and cost effective, it may also lead to
inefficient implementation of the project, and so therefore needs to be accounted for.
The model calls for the monitoring of such efforts and for outreach to correct such
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
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inefficiencies. The final step calls for further advocacy and reevaluation in finalizing the
scaling up project.
The “Nine Step Model” is a very useful tool for implementing scaling up, and one
of the only ones officially published. A concern about this model may be that some of its
characteristics are more adaptable to health based innovations, which are the model’s
main target projects. Step seven of the model is one such example. However, such
factors can be either ignored or readapted, and this model can certainly be used for
scaling up all development projects because it emphasizes the goals of a non “top
down” approach previously discussed: evaluation, monitoring, local participation, and
sustainability.
The WHO and Scaling up
Given the benefits of the “Nine Step Model”, one would think that the WHO would
be a leader in the development of scaled up projects. However, the WHO does not
always execute the model to its fullest extent in its projects and guidelines for scaling
up. For example, in its Operational Guidance for Scaling up Male Circumcision Services
for HIV Prevention (WHO & UNAIDS 2008), the WHO evaluates ways to scale up male
circumcision services that are safe and can prevent the spread of HIV. In its advice for
the implementation of such programs on the local level, they stress the importance of
increasing outreach initiatives; however they do not mention anything about working
with religious and local leaders on this issue. In their discussion on improving advocacy,
they mention the importance of “traditional leaders” (WHO & UNAIDS 2008) but put
more of an emphasis on working with media. The omission of religious leaders from the
implementation of scaled up circumcision programs marks a lost opportunity for the
WHO to more effectively scale up programs, particularly given the religious importance
of circumcision.
Partial execution of their own model, as shown by the male circumcision
example, is not the only flaw in the WHO’s scaling up practices. From the nine step
model it was clear that less of a prominence is given to horizontal scaling up (step six),
especially when it comes to adaptation to new communities. Choprau and Ford (2005)
touch upon this subject in their analysis of scaling up health promotion interventions;
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saying that such projects do not often address community preference during replication.
This indicates that the WHO, despite employing one of the only concrete scale up
models in the development world, has not yet completely committed to making scaling
up a priority in project planning.
Other Development Organizations’ Approaches to Scaling Up
Aside from the WHO and ExpandNet’s approaches, this study aimed to describe
and compare the ways other organizations working for international development scale
up their projects and the guidelines they use for this purpose. However, research on
scaling up practices among different development organizations found that very few
have published official guidelines to scaling up in the matter that the WHO has. Even
from the information available on individual scaling up efforts done by development
organizations, it becomes clear that scaling up is more of an undefined concept than a
clear development goal for most of the development world. Two development
organizations’ scaling up approaches are discussed to show this point
The World Bank
While a traditional implementer of the “top down” approach, the Bank has began
efforts at scaling up, or so it would seem from first glance. However, they have not
published any official scaling up guidelines, as the WHO has done with the “Nine Step
Model”. An analysis of projects that the World Bank deems it is scaling up also reveals
that they in fact view scaling up in a completely different way than as a project planning
and implementing tool. Instead of focusing on scaling up as a development planning
process, the World Bank sees it as a term meaning an increase in funds and efforts to
an already existing project or an increase in commitment to a country, region, or issue.
For example, the World Bank called its approval of a road rehabilitation program in the
island nation of Kiribati “a scale up of commitment” to the country (World Bank 2011).
Even projects that can be effectively planned and implemented through a scaling
up of a successfully tested pilot project are not really executed in such a way despite
the scale up potential and the World Bank calling them “scaling up efforts”. Such an
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example comes from a microfinance project done by the World Bank in India. The
project dubbed “Scaling up Sustainable and Responsible Microfinance” in India, seeks
“to scale up access to sustainable microfinance services to the financially excluded,
particularly under-served areas of India” (World Bank 2010a). The scale up potential is
clear: a pilot project providing microfinance services done in one of the “under-served
areas” can be implemented and tested to see if it is resulting in more financial inclusion,
a rise in income and standard of living etc., and then the successful project could be
scaled up to other areas. However, an analysis of the status report of the project (World
Bank 2010b) reveals no elements of scaling up and also that $300 million had been
approved for the project without a clear explanation as to how the project was
preliminarily evaluated or what the results are expected to be. Therefore, it is safe to
say that while the World Bank maintains that it is scaling up, it is very much still
operating under a “top down” model which, as the Bank’s experience from the
Polonoroeste project described previously shows, will probably not yield effective
results.
United Nations Development Programme
The UNDP also involves itself in scaling up programs, but, like the World Bank,
has no official guidelines on scaling up. However, they have an interest in supporting
horizontal scaling up, or replication. For this purpose, the UNDP published a report of
successful projects that have used scale up models to achieve positive results towards
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (UNDG Policy Network for MDGs 2008).
Each project is briefly described, with the technical specifications given, and the goals
and outcomes discussed. The end of the project overview discusses lessons that have
been learned and the potential for replication for this project elsewhere, a useful tool for
other development planners looking to scale up projects.
One project from this report, for example, deals with the implementation of small
irrigation wells that were tested in Niger and Burkina Faso. At the pilot stage, the
irrigation systems were affecting about 10,000 people in each country. The project
proved to be a success, with participating farmers experiencing higher crop yields and
increased income. The project was then scaled up vertically to a national irrigation
Jossif Ezekilov Global Health and Development Policy Program, Geneva
18

program in Burkina Faso. The report then continues with the lessons learned,
emphasizing the need to build community ownership, and then states that the irrigation
technology is very replicable and has been horizontally scaled up in neighboring sites
(UNDG Policy Network for MDGs 2008).
The report published by the UNDP is valuable in that it allows development
planners to see how other projects were scaled up and the opportunity to learn from the
experiences of their colleagues. However, as the report focuses solely on the potential
of “replicability” of each project and does not give specifics about how each project was
scaled up from the pilot stage, it remains incomplete. While the report shows more of a
commitment to scaling up than the World Bank is currently putting forward, the fact that
no scaling up guidelines has been published by the UNDP means that they are also not
fully committed to making scaling up a development paradigm. It would be especially
beneficial for the UNDP, as a United Nations organization, to create such guidelines
because it would increase awareness of the benefits of scaling up and send a message
to other development organizations to begin adopting this approach.
Case Studies
In order to show the true effectiveness that scaling up can have, real
development projects that have been scaled up must be examined. Three case studies
will be presented for this purpose. One is a project that has followed the ExpandNet
model, while two others have followed independent models. All three cases
demonstrate different benefits of scaling up.
Case Study #1: The Community-Based Health Planning and Services Initiative in
Ghana
Nyonator et al. (2007) describe a project designed to increase primary health
care in Ghana that closely follows the ExpandNet approach to scaling up. Ghana had
had problems implementing successful primary health care programs in the past, and
so in the 1990’s a task force was set up to create a more effective, community-based
program. The task force decided to implement a pilot project that would put a nurse at
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the community level, with volunteers assisting and also raising awareness about health
issues and family planning.
The district of Navrongo was chosen to as the pilot project site. Located in
northern Ghana, Navrongo was a district which at the time suffered from high rates of
malaria, diarrheal disease, and child mortality (Adongo et al. 1997). Before the project
got under way, the task force set up focus groups in three villages in Navrongo to
discuss health problems in the area as the locals saw them. Tribal leaders and elders
were also employed to secure volunteer commitment as well as provide for logistics
(Nyonator et al. 2007). The project began with a nurse and volunteers being put into
each of several communities. The results from the pilot project were quite successful.
Child mortality was reduced by one third (Nyarko et al. 2005), and immunization
coverage, as well as maternal and family planning care increased (Debpuur et al. 2002).
Bolstered by the success at Navrongo, the project was then scaled up
horizontally to the district of Nkwanta in the south. In 1998, health officials from both
districts met to discuss project details and the potential for replication. They decided that
the project can indeed be scaled up to Nkwanta with the hopes of similar success. The
Nkwanta district was experiencing much the same health problems that Navrongo was
experiencing before the implementation of the pilot project. However, there were
fundamental differences in culture between the two districts, namely differences in
diversity and linguistics. While Navrongo was much more homogenous, Nkwanta’s
villages could host up to five distinct ethno-linguistic groups (Nyonator et al. 2007).
Therefore, the project was modified to include teachers, instead of elders and chiefs,
into the resource team. Once the needed modifications were done and the project was
implemented, Nkwanta received similarly positive results, even exceeding Navrongo in
some areas (Awoonor-Williams et al. 2004).
In 2000, the project scaled up vertically into what was called the Communitybased Health Planning and Services Initiative (CHPS) (Nyonator et al. 2007). This
initiative would seek to create similar projects as in Navrongo and Nkwanta in all
districts in Ghana. By mid-2004, 105 of the 110 districts had implemented CHPS with
varying but mainly positive results.
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Case Study #2: Second Teacher Hiring in Rajasthan, India
Banerjee et al. (2001) gives an example of a pilot project by an Indian NGO,
Seva Mandir, which works for the development of the state of Rajasthan, in northwest
India. Among the actions that Seva Mandir undertakes is the maintenance of more than
170 non-formal education centers in southern Rajasthan for children 6 to 14 who do not
attend formal schooling (Seva Mandir, 2010). However, these centers were at one time
suffering from high teacher and student absenteeism.
To address this problem, the NGO decided to hire a second teacher, mainly a
woman so as to increase female attendance, in 21 of the education centers (normally
there was one teacher for every center). The impact of the project was measured by
examining attendance and also through a test given at the end of the year. The results
were mixed: while the attendance of girls did rise, there was no change in test scores
(Duflo 2004). Because the results were inconclusive, Seva Mandir decided not to scale
up the project.
Case Study #3: The PROGRESA Program
One of the most successful welfare projects in recent history has been the
PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) program in Mexico. This
program, created by the Mexican government and the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) in 1997, gave grants to Mexican households on certain
conditions such as the acceptance of preventive health services, attending nutritional
and prenatal care clinics, and consistent school attendance of school-age children
(Gertler & Boyce 2001). This project by no means started from the “top down” despite it
being government driven, and a pilot project was created to assess the effects of the
conditional cash program.
506 communities were initially selected to participate in the pilot project, half of
which were given the cash transfers. The results proved to be quite positive. Gertler and
Boyce (2001) conclude that, comparing households who were given the cash transfers
with those that weren’t, there was a 23 percent decrease in the incidence of disease in
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the cash transfer households, an 18 percent decrease in anemia, and a 25 percent
increase in children’s height.
Given this success, the project was scaled vertically to include 2.6 million families
by 2000, with a given budget of over $800 million (Duflo 2004). The project continued to
enhance human capital even on the national level, accounting for a 30 percent
reduction in the depth of poverty in Mexico (IFPRI 2002). The project was then
implemented in other Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Colombia, Honduras,
and Nicaragua, with the help of the World Bank (Gertler & Boyce 2001).

Discussion
Overall, scaling up shows great promise as an alternative to the “top down”
approach. ExpandNet’s definition and model on scaling up offers an intriguing approach
to development planning. ExpandNet’s focus on successfully tested pilot projects,
environment assessment, building a resource team, and horizontal and vertical scaling
up approaches make their version of scaling up most adequate to address the goals
needed for a non “top down” approach, namely preliminary evaluation, monitoring, local
participation, and development sustainability.
Of the major development organizations examined, only one, the WHO with its
“Nine Step Model”, had official guidelines for developing a scaling up project. The “Nine
Step Model” reiterates and expands upon many of ExpandNet’s principles, further
emphasizing local involvement and continuous readapting of the project to fit the
specific needs of the people affected by the project. Despite its benefits, however, it was
found that the WHO does not implement the “Nine Step Model” to the fullest extent in
some cases and puts less of an emphasis on horizontal scaling up. Despite their flaws,
the WHO remains well ahead of other major development organizations, which have yet
to fully commit to scaling up. The United Nations Development Programme puts an
emphasis on replication and has provided a useful tool for learning from past scale up
experiences. However, their lack of official guidelines on scaling up proves they are not
yet fully committed to making scaling up a development paradigm, and marks a lost
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opportunity in bringing scaling up to the center stage of development planning. The
World Bank, for their part, shares no part in developing true scaling up initiatives.
The three case studies illustrated the many different benefits of scaling up. Case
Study #1 followed the ExpandNet approach by creating a resource team (task force),
assessing specific cultural factors, and employing locals in the project planning and
execution. This led to a successful pilot project, replicated success in another district,
and a vertical scaling up to a national program that has increased primary health care in
Ghana.
Case Study #2 constituted a project failure, but it showed a very important aspect
of scaling up: that of the reduced cost of project failure. Though the project was
abandoned because of inconclusive results, the costs of this failure were relatively
small, basically composed of the salaries paid to the second teachers in the 21
education centers. Had the project been implemented “top down style”, i.e. if Seva
Mandir had gone ahead and implemented the project to all of its education centers, the
costs for this failure would have been times higher.
Case Study #3 shows how a scaled up project can go from the community to the
national, and even to the international level. The fact that PROGRESA grew from a pilot
project in Mexico to an international development success story replicated in at least
four other countries, all within a span of less than five years, shows just how powerful a
carefully tested scaled up project can be.
Limitations of Scaling Up
The biggest limitation to scaling up is that it remains largely conceptual in the
eyes of the development world. The fact that most development organizations have no
framework to even talk about scaling up their projects makes it clear that scaling up as a
development planning tool still has a long way to go before it gains the prominence it
deserves. Realistically, scaling up is also not meant for every type of project, and
therefore is not applicable to every organization. For example, it would be difficult to
scale up an infrastructure project, and organizations that finance such projects cannot
really then implement a scale up approach. However, even if a project cannot be
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created through the scale up model, some of the main aspects of the scale up
approach, environmental assessment for example, are still invaluable tools in making
effective and sustainable projects.
Another limitation to scaling up is that developing a project through the scale up
process sometimes requires quite a bit of time before the true impact is felt. The initial
preparation and pilot stage may require several months or even years to create a
project that is ready to be scaled up (assuming the project tests successfully). From
then, it could be several more years before a project achieves consideration as a policy
at the national or sub national level. For this reason, development organizations are not
willing to commit to this type of development model. It is also difficult to leverage
governments to accept and work with scaling up models; making small investments for
pilot projects at the lowest level of administration does not have as much political
enticement for government officials as signing a huge multi-million dollar “top down”
project. Until scaling up receives prominence both among international organizations as
well as international governments, it will remain largely a conceptual goal rather than a
development paradigm.
Recommendations
In order to be able to address the problems facing the development world,
scaling up must be brought to the forefront of development rhetoric and action.
Development organizations must begin to look at scaling up as a way to create and
implement development projects, and in so doing, disillusion themselves from the “top
down” approach. For this purpose, each major development organization should create
official guidelines for scaling up, using ExpandNet and the WHO’s “Nine Step Model” as
examples of what to focus on. Conferences, workshops, seminars etc. are also needed
to disseminate information about scaling up across all development spheres.
One of the first steps that the development world can make towards fully
implementing scaling up is to increase partnerships among development organizations
and to get organizations to work together. Many times development organizations
create huge development projects that essentially “reinvent the wheel” instead of
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collaborating with other organizations or NGOs that have either put in place similar
measures or have more experience and a better niche in the area that a project is
attempting to develop. Case Study #3 gives a perfect example of how partnerships can
create development success: PROGRESA was executed by the Mexican government,
monitored by IFPRI, and then replicated with the help of the World Bank. Such
partnerships, however, are rare, as development organizations want exclusive credit for
the success of a potential project.
In the context of scaling up, bigger development organizations can use projects
successfully implemented by smaller organizations as their pilot projects, and then
replicate those projects internationally. For example, the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation, a relatively small development organization, has successfully scaled
up a bed net program in Tanzania (SDC 2011). If a larger organization, such as the
World Bank, were seeking to make a bed net program in the region, they could simply
partner with SDC and jointly replicate a bed net program (following scale up guidance
such as the one provided by ExpandNet). This would go a long ways towards moving
away from the “top down” approach and making development projects more effective
and less costly.
Finally there needs to be much more research done on scaling up’s potential.
Further research needs to be done on using scaling up in a wider variety of
development projects (food, education, economics, etc.), as most of the research
focuses on health-based initiatives. Second, more research needs to be done on key
areas of the scaling up approach; resource team selection, environment assessment
techniques, specifics of horizontal and vertical scaling up, just to name several areas.

Conclusion
60 years of development history have produced little progress, save for the
creation of a highly ineffective and at times detrimental “top down” approach. People
living in poverty and underdevelopment deserve better than what has been provided for
the last 60 years, and the development world can provide better. In fact, development
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world must provide a better solution, because the demand of underdevelopment will be
greater in the future than ever before.
In order to face the development needs of the future, an alternative development
planning strategy that can give more effective results must be implemented. Through its
demonstrated focus on the goals of evaluation, monitoring, local participation, and
sustainability, scaling up has the potential to be that alternative. It is up to the
development world as a whole to come together and work towards this approach, and,
in so doing, achieve global prosperity.
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Work Journal
Work sites: The International Centre for Migration Health, and Development, Versier,
Switzerland; The WHO Library, Geneva, Switzerland; The UN Library, Geneva,
Switzerland; SIT Business Center, Nyon, Switzerland; Ecole Migros, Nyon, Switzerland;
Homestay in Prangins, Switzerland.
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Databases used: EBSCO, WHOLIS, Google Scholar.
January-March, 2011: This time was spent formulating my research question. After
much deliberation, I chose to officially pursue the topic of scaling up on March 4, 2011.
Basic preliminary research was done from March 10 to March 14. Meetings with experts
began to be scheduled around March 15.
April 4th: Meeting with Dr. Manuel Carballo. He advised me to look into which specific
organizations scale up. He also advised me to put scaling up into the context of the
history of development.
April 5-8th: This time was spent researching and reaching out to other organizations for
information and feedback. GAIN, Green Cross International, the Council on Health
Research for Development, the International Red Cross, the Foundation for Innovative
New Diagnostics, and SDC were the main organizations contacted. This took place
mostly at ICMHD as well as my homestay.
April 11th: Received feedback from GAIN. The representative from GAIN who had given
a briefing to SIT told me of their efforts to increase their business partnerships for
fortification programs and gave me links to further research. It was decided that this
type of scaling up is not beneficial to the study.
April 12th: Research at the WHO yielded very good results. Through the WHOLIS
database, “The Nine Step Model” and other valuable resources were found. Research
was then conducted on ExpandNet, which yielded even greater results.
April 13th-17th: Further research was done on the ExpandNet model at the WHO library,
the homestay, and ICMHD, and it was decided that this would be a beneficial basis for
the study. One answer from Green Cross International proved to yield no relevant
information. It was decided during this time that the study would have to be based solely
on literature review.
April 18th-19th: Research at the UN Library yielded great results in resources for
examining the history of development. Several books on development history were
examined. The Polonoroeste case study was discovered and synthesized.
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April 20th – 22nd: Research at ICMHD, homestay, and business center on the
development policies of development organizations. On repeated detailed searches in
multiple databases, no official guidelines were discovered for the World Bank, IMF,
UNDP, Oxfam, SDC, and NORAD, and others. This led to the conclusion that such
guidelines have not yet been implemented. Individual projects from the World Bank and
the SDC as well as the UNDP’s report on replication projects were useful tools in getting
a sense of scaling up practices and commitment of these organizations and it was
decided that those organizations would be discussed in the study.
April 25th – 28th: The study began to be written at ICMHD and homestay. The
introduction, methodology and definition portions were completed. Some difficulty
remained in deciding how to organize the results section. It was decided to that given
the lack of data on official guidelines and practices, the results should first use the
ExpandNet definition, discuss the WHO’s model, and then address the rest of the
development organizations. It was decided that SDC would be omitted from the
discussion given the fact that it Case studies were discovered, and quickly synthesized.
April 29th – May 3rd: The study was completed during this time.
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